This essay develops an anlytical approach to problems of distributive justice. It attempts to answer two questions: (1) under which circumstances would rational individuals demand just distributive arrangements? and (2) given the number of possible distributive arrangements, how is one selected? the article develops a model that accounts for the conditions for the emergence and selection of rules of just distribution. The essay considers that distributive justice governs the distribution of the benefits and the burdens of social cooperation, and that it constituttes an attribute of instituttions. The conditions for the emergence of rules for just distribution are defined by the nature of the goods to be distributed and the rules that regulate their production rules of an iterated prisoner´s dilemma as well as the three circumstances of justice: scarce goods, moderately self interested individuals and equal status among individuals. The selection of rules for just distribution is explained by the collective and individual advantages and disadvantages expected from their operation, and the two mechanisms of rule selection available to individuals with conflicting interests: barbaining and competititon.